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1 INTRODUCTION
The primary mission of the African National Con-
gress of South Africa (ANC) as stated on numerous
occasions is the political economic and social
emancipation of the majority of the people of South
Africa, i.e. the Black people2. This mission
statement in a real sense summarizes what the
struggle against the apartheid system has been all
about. It is important to remember, though, that
this long-lived struggle against apartheid included
the active participation of many of South Africa's
White population. But giving content to this
mission statement has demanded a great deal of
work which was not really thought through or
put together in detail. The process of detailed
research seems to have been triggered off by a
number of research projects since 1985 which
sought to define more closely the character of the
post-apartheid South Africa (PASA)3.
Formulating economic policy has been one of the
most difficult and challenging tasks confronting
the democratic forces. 'Getting the economy right'
is crucial to South Africa's future social and
political stability, as well as to meeting the
reservoir of untapped basic needs of much of our
population.
The policy process in the ANC has a number of
layers which if not properly understood, can lead to
major errors of judgement and analysis. These
layers can be summarized as follows: the constitu
Tito Mboweni is Deputy Head of the Department of
Economic Planning, ANC. These are his personal
observations and do not represent the views of either the
ANC or the Department of Economic Planning.
2 'Black' refers to the African, Coloured and Indian peoples
in South Africa.
Numerous conferences and seminars began to mushroom
about 1985 looking at PASA. Some of the most prominent
ones were the York University Conference (1986) and the
Lausanne Colloquium (1989). Research centres were also
started during the same period, e.g. the Centre for
Development Studies (CDS) and the South African Research
project (SASPRO).
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tional structures; the policy departments; the
positions of the allies of the ANC (in particular
COSATU); the experiences of developing countries;
the lobbying efforts of capital, the media, western
governments, and independent commentators; and
policy research work of the IMF and World Bank.
The key layers are those of the ANC constitutional
structures, the work of the policy departments and
the policy positions of the Alliance partners. How-
ever, experience in other countries shows that the
role of other forces, particularly the business sector,
the IMF and World Bank cannot be underestimated.
2 THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES
The elected bodies of the ANC compose the
important constitutional structures. The highest
policy making body in the ANC is the National
Conference which is convened every three years. In
between these National Conferences, the National
Executive Committee (NEC) is the highest policy
making body. Further, the Nation3! Wotht Com-
mittee (NWC) or the ANC 'Cabinet' as it is referred
to by other people, can also make policies in between
the meetings of the NEC.4
Therefore only recommendations endorsed by these
structures can be considered as constituting ANC
policy. The media in particular has misunderstood
this fact. From time to time they refer to statements
The NEC is elected by National Conference for a term of
three years. The NEC at its first meeting, elects a smaller
National Working Committee which runs the day to day
affairs of the ANC. Theoretically, every department in the
ANC should be headed by a member of the NWC. These
heads of department are also supposed to meet regularly
with the Secretary General. The full meetings of the NWC
take place every week and are attended by the officials as
well. The officials are the President, Deputy President,
National Chairman, Secretary General, Deputy Secretary
General and the Treasurer General.
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by individual members of the ANC as policy.
Granted one would expect that when people in
official positions speak, they should be reflecting
official positions, but this has not always been
the case5. This confusion between official policy
and policy issues contained in an individual's
speech or paper, has resulted in what people
within the ranks have called making policy on the
hoof! This often leads to some confusion regarding
ANC policy.
Thus it is important to underscore that policy is
made by the constitutional structures of the ANC
and no individual has any constitutional right to
make policy on the hoof for the organization.
3 POLICY DEPARTMENTS
There are a number of policy departments in the
ANC. Amongst these are: Economic Planning,
Health, Human Resources Development, Local Gov-
ernment and Housing, Arts and Culture, Educa-
tion and Social Welfare. Whilst these are policy
departments, they do not make policy but can
only develop policy recommendations which
they submit to National Conference, the NEC and
NWC for consideration. There can be no doubt
though that what these departments recommend
does carry a lot of weight. But it would be a
mistake once again to think that what these depart-
ments say or have developed, is by definition
ANC policy. Many people also make the mistake
of elevating policy departments to policy-making
structures.
The Department of Economic Planning for one, is
probably one of the most active departments in the
ANC. It has a number of divisions such as trade
and industry, science and technology, land and
agriculture, minerals and energy, and fiscal and
monetary policy. It is also responsible for the follow-
ing policy areas: transport, environment, develop-
ment planning, labour markets, regional policy in
This issue gets to the central unresolved difficulty of when
is an official's opinion private and when is it official. There
are some officials in the movements who have been able to
defend their right to have a private opinion yet others have
failed to do so. In general though, if one states that one is not
speaking or writing in an official capacity, that should be
sufficient to indicate the status of one's position. For example,
the views in this article are my personal views and can in no
sense be constituted as representing the views of my
colleagues, the DEP in the ANC.
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southern Africa, public corporations, and monitor-
ing and analysis of IMF and World Bank research
and policies.
The DEP. accordingly has a political head who is a
member of the NWC and is staffed by a team of
economists and other relevant policy development
and analysis coordinators. The Department is
linked to a number of researchers who are based at
several centres around South Africa and abroad.
The most well known research facility for the
DEP is the Macroeconomic Research Group
(MERG). But the DEP also related to and benefits
from the work of the Industrial Strategy Project
(ISP)6 and other work of the anti-apartheid
economics community.
In practice, it means that every DEP division
works in close collaboration with a research net-
work. For example, the trade and industry division
would work with the ISP, COSATU and other
economists and industrial sociologists working in
this area. The system does not always work that
well, but it has proved to be a very useful and
productive mechanism for incorporating democrati-
cally minded economists and researchers into our
policy work.
The DEP has to process all the research material and
arrange it in a policy framework. This is not easy and
requires a combination of technical skills and politi-
cal experience. At the end of the day, responsibility
for any policy positions proposed for consideration
by the constitutional structures rests with DEP in
relation to economic policy. Once again the process
can be very difficult and frustrating.
4 POLICY POSITIONS OF ALLIES
One of the principal allies of the ANC in South
Africa has been the Congress of South African
Trade Unions (COSATU). COSATU's overall
policy thrust is guided by their strategic vision of
6 The ISP is a research project of the Economic Trends
Group (El). The project was undertaken in collaboration
with COSATU and later the ANC also began to be involved
with the project. An impressive number of research papers
is currently being processed. See elsewhere in this Bulletin
for an initial summary of their analysis and policy
conclusions.
building socialism in South Africa. The ANC, on the
other hand, is a multi-class based national
liberation movement whose central thrust is the
building of a democratic, non-racial society which
brings together the various classes within the
context of a mixed economy and socio-economic
development. The objectives of these principal allies
may seem to sit rather uncomfortably with one
another and this could be expected to cause some
serious ideological differences and tensions between
the ANC and COSATU.
COSATU accepts that the task of the ANC is not
to build socialism, but to create a truly democratic
society in which the different ideological positions
can be debated and around which organizations
can be built in pursuance of their objectives
without state hindrances. It is also critica 1 to
understand that COSATU is a trade union
federation and not a political party. Tensions are
inevitable between the ANC and COSATU and
such tensions must be expected to come to the fore in
the coming months and years. Be that as it may,
COSATU has played an important role in counter-
balancing whatever influence there may be on the
ANC from capital, the IMF, the World Bank and
western governments.
5 EXPERIENCES FROM OTHER DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
In general, the ANC takes the experience of other
countries very seriously in the policy development
work. The fact that many ANC cadres lived and
worked in many of these countries during their
years in exile has also enriched this process tremen-
dously. Obviously, in their research work, most of
the researchers do comparative analysis with
other developing, newly industrialized and devel-
oped countries as well. The accusations by
sections of capital and also by some ANC
detractors that the ANC has not learnt anything
from international experience is simply not true.
However, there are lessons and 'lessons' in real life
since people draw different conclusions from the
same experiences.
In addition, the ANC research networks include
experienced researchers from North America (with
Latin American and developing country experi-
ences), the UK, the African continent and India.
These connections have played an important part
in ensuring that policy is not ignorant of interna-
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tional experiences as well. Most importantly though,
some of these international researchers have been
valuable in pinpointing, fairly early on in the policy
process, some major gaps and errors awaiting a new
democratic government.
6 THE ROLE OF CAPITAL, THE MEDIA,
COMMENTATORS AND WESTERN
GOVERNMENTS
Capital, both domestic and international, sees itself
as being the party likely to lose the most when a
democratic South Africa becomes a reality. The
reasons for this are not hard to find. None of them are
unaware of the historically interconnected, almost
umbilical connections between the apartheid state,
racism and capital in South Africa. Their fear is that
in post-apartheid South Africa, at least two critical
elements of the above equation will be deleted.
These elements are racism and the apartheid state.
In many cases the business community tends to
see these developments as anti-capital since the
movement has indicated it is committed to such
policies as affirmative action, antitrust actions, in-
dustrial restructuring, a wage-skills nexus, and
others. Even though nationalism no longer
features on top of the agenda for the ANC, it does
for COSATU and this is seen as yet another threat
to business.
Given the above perceptions and concerns, capital
has decided to go on the offensive through its
media and also by directly appealing to various
elements within the ANC. Lunches, dinners and
receptions are being organized on a regular basis.
In addition weekend outings are taking place with
what capital considers to be 'influential' ANC
policy makers. Indeed, there are very few, if
any, within the policy departments of the NEC
and NWC who have not been invited to these func-
tions and outings. There have also been numerous
offers of (free!) technical assistance to the movement
by capital.
One of the most dramatic policy interventions by
capital was, in my view, when the chairman of an
international oil and industrial conglomerate
hired a private jet and came to South Africa to
speak to the president of the ANC to persuade
the ANC leadership that nationalization was a
doomed policy! Unfortunately for him the
president was too busy to attend this meeting.
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The media in South Africa, as in many other coun-
tries, plays a major role, albeit an indirect one, in
the policy formulation process. An example in this
regard could be the media treatment of
nationalization as propagated by the ANC
president, Nelson Mandela. In what looked like a
coordinated media offensive, Mandela was attacked
and criticized on a regular basis until he began to
show some flexibility on the issue. Similarly, I have
been hammered by the media for daring to
suggest that a reconstruction levy should be intro-
duced as part of the financing of socio-economic
development in the post-apartheid period7. The
media's success in my case is clearly illustrated by
the unwillingness of the ANC leadership to touch
the issue of a reconstruction levy.
There are many other examples of how the media
has influenced certain decisions and yet they are
not accountable to the constitutional structures of
the ANC. Sometimes the media pushes though
certain policies to be made on th e hoof by
deliberately asking prominent leadership questions
in situations where an answer has to be given. This
has often led to policies being 'announced' which
have actually never been thoroughly researched or
discussed in the movement. In the process, the
media generates a host of sometimes contradictory
policy pronouncements from amongst the leader-
ship. This is by far one of the most dangerous
tendencies in the media which is likely to intensify
when a democratic government (with many Black
faces!) comes into office. The objective would be to
show that such a new government does not know
what it is doing.
It is easy to say that one should not bother to reply to
deliberately provocative questions from the media.
But that is more easily said than done.
Closely related to the media is the role of the so-
called independent commentators whose opinions
seem to be generally valued more than those of
the policy spokespersons of the ANC. Usually
journalists in South Africa use phrases such as
'experts say', or this or that commentator said.
Mboweni, T' "Burden sharing" the way', in The Star
(Johannesburg), June 30 1993. Some of the responses
were: 'Call it a reconstruction levy wealth tax, or what
you will, the idea would amount to redistribution through
government extracting more money from the overburdened
formal sector of the economy ... Redistribution is necessary
but can only be achieved successfully by boosting
ids bulletin vol 25 no 11994
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In some cases, some people are actually being
quoted but in many instances, no-one is quoted.
Thus the media create their own 'expert
commentators'.
In situations where these commentators do com-
ment, they are usually opposed to what the move-
ment is saying. By so doing, they construct a
widespread view which makes the movement's
position look foolish and not worth implementing.
There are instances as well where some of our
people have retreated very fast from difficult
policy positions as a result of what commentators
and media have said about a specific policy issue.
But, it is instructive that in the majority of cases the
movement has ridden the storm and stuck to the
policy regardless.
The diplomatic representation in South Africa of
western governments has been a key centre of
policy intervention by these countries. Normally
the ambassador or the consular general arranges
receptions and dinners at which policy issues are
debated at length and sometimes things like 'my
government thinks that your policy on this or that
is dangerous' or 'we suggest that you drop this
or that policy and try our example' and so on.
At times, some of these diplomats organize
closed seminars in which policy issues are
discussed and the 'ill advised' policies of the
democratic movement are said to be bad for
business and economic growth (never mind
redistribution!).
There are also instances where visiting ministers
sometimes - I think - overstep their diplomatic
courtesy and lecture the movement leadership on
policy issues. For some reason, these ministers
or delegations are confident that they can change
the views of the movement with this kind of
pressure. At times, encounters such as this are
used by these ministers to argue the case for
capital's agenda. And it is all presented in a
supposedly non-ideological basis of 'support' for
the movement! Many of these politicians seem
to forget that sometimes they used to be the
productivity and investment, by building confidence in the
market economy' 'Taxing idea',The Cape Times (editorial).
The Finance Week editorial said: 'Allow (Mboweni) his
way and there won't be sufficient businessmen with R500 to
lavish on messages of reassurance at his leader's future
birthday parties'.
major opponents of the movement during the
difficult days of apartheid. Now they are all so
friendly and determined to protect certain policy
approaches.
7 THE IMFANDTHE WORLD BANK
As elsewhere in the developing world, the ¡MF and
the World Bank are also determined to influence the
policy agenda in South Africa. The IMF visits South
Africa every year in terms of Article IV require-
ments. In our experience, the Fund is far more rigid
and deals only with the ancien régime. Their Article
IV papers are highly influencial in government policy
circles but they remain uninfluential in the demo-
cratic movement since they are not officially made
available to us8.
The World Bank has begun to work on some South
Africa research since 1990. In contrast to the ¡MF,
the Bank's approach has bee n different. It has
decided to work very closely with the democratic
movement in their research programme. In the
process it has engaged South African researchers
associated with the movement, These researchers
have always retained their righ t to dissociate
themselves with the final conclusions of the Bank
in case these prove to be in conflict with research
findings.
The Bank's research results have made a big impact
in South Africa9. Although many of us are very
critical of the Bank's general policy approach,
some of their research reports have been well
researched and are of a high technical quality.
However, it is to soon to tell how their policy
proposals will be treated by an incoming demo-
cratic movement. In general, the movement is
highly sceptical of the record of the Bank and
Fund with respect to their structural adjustment
8 The only IMF document which gained some prominence
in South Africa was published in 1992. Lauchman, D. et al.:
Economic Policies for new South Africa.
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programmes. But the multilateral institution have
been astute, and they have not as yet really
suggested policy along the traditional lines. Thus
some of their work, as in the Belli Report on Trade
(1993), have been well regarded by a wide range
of forces.
8 BURGERS IN THE POLICY SANDWICH
At times those of us working in policy departments
have felt like burgers in the policy sandwich. At the
rational level, we want policy to be developed from
research and be influenced by the political positions
of the movement. However, the 'policy noises' cre-
ated by all the forces discussed above can make life
very uncomfortable. And there is nothing as frustrat-
ing as working on a policy recommendation which is
not accepted by the constitutional structures; worse
still is to work on something which in all respects
makes good policy for transformation but only to
have the movement shy away from it due to external
pressures. The danger in such situations is that
policy begins to lack internal consistency and could
become a collection of lowest common denominator
interests. Yet there is a feeling of internal fulfilment
and joy when Conference or other policy structures
of the movement adopt - albeit with amendments -
certain policy recommendations put forward by the
policy departments.
The conclusion drawn from the South African expe-
rience so far illustrates the importance of balancing
the various interest of the competing forces with
one's political or if I may use the term, ideological
position. There are certain essential principles which
the movement should never compromise upon if it is
to remain the vehicle for the political, social and
economic transformation of South Africa and by
so doing to improve the standard of living for the
majority of Black people.
Two examples are Fallon P. et al, 1993: South Africa,
Economic Performance and Some Policy Implications
(Washington: The World Bank) and Belli, P., Finger, M.,
and Ballivan, A., 1993: South Africa, A Review of Trade
Policies (Washington: The World Bank).
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